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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELWOOD K. McFARLAND, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Case No. 18352 
vs. ) 
SKAGGS, INC., ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and 
judgment in favor of Respondent in a case of false 
arrest. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury in the Second Judicial District Court 
for Weber County, the Honorable RONALD O. HYDE, judge 
presiding, returned a verdict in favor of Respondent 
for false arrest in the amount of $10,000.00 general 
damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this Court to uphold the 
jury verdict and judgment below and dismiss this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the exception of the first paragraph, the 
Statement of Facts presented by Appellant is totally irrel-
evant. The cardinal rule of appellate procedure is that 
the party prevailing below is entitled to have facts and 
evidence reviewed by this Court in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict. Hutchison v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 
(Utah 1981); Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980); 
Gassner v. Dairyman Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1980); Ute-Cal Land Development Corporation v. Sather, 605 
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). The facts, as testified to at the 
trial by Respondent, are as follows: 
On January 9, 1980, at about 5:30 P.M., ELWOOD K. 
McFARLAND, Respondent, entered a Skaggs Drug Store in Ogden, 
Utah, for the purpose of purchasing a T.V. antenna plug, as 
he had been requested to do by his wife. (Record p.6.) 
Respondent was familiar with the Skaggs store and had 
shopped there frequently, as it was very close to his 
dentistry office. After checking the two store racks where 
he expected the part to be, Respondent, after not finding 
the part, left the store. A few steps outside the exit, 
Respondent was accosted by ANITA AVONDET. Avondet was not 
wearing any identifying badges or clothing which would in 
any way denote that she was a security officer for the 
Skaggs store. (R. 15, 18, and 130-131.) Further, Avondet 
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did not identify herself as a security officer. (R. 15.) 
She merely stated to Respondent, "Sir, I want to talk to 
you. " (R. 16.) 
Respondent, unaware of Ms. Avondet's status as a 
security guard or any reason for her concern, attempted to 
step past Avondet and extended his arm to brush her away -
thinking she was trying to sell him something. (R. 16.) At 
that time a scuffle ensued with Avondet forcibly grabbing 
Respondent by both lapels. (R. 14.) 
At some point during the scuffle, while Respondent 
was attempting to release Ms. Avondet's unwarranted grasp of 
his lapels, Respondent suddenly realized that Avondet was 
·not just some kook trying to sell him books or flowers 
since these kooks don't usually fight you for your money. 
(R. 44.) Respondent indicated to Avondet that he understood 
what she wanted, but she was making a big mistake. (R. 20.) 
Avondet responded that she wasn't paid "to make 
mistakes." (R. 20.) Accordingly, Respondent ceased 
scuffling and accompanied Avondet back through the store, 
under the humiliating gazes of store employees and customers, 
and up to the security office. 
After Respondent was seated in the office, Avondet 
called the police and reported a "shoplifting case." (R. 20.) 
Avondet then asked Respondent to "take whatever you've taken 
from that pocket right there" while pointing to Respondent's 
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right-hand raincoat pocket. (R. 20.) 
produced his car kets from the pocket. 
Respondent thereupon 
(R. 23.) Avondet 
made no further search of Respondent, though Respondent 
specifically asked her if she wanted to. (R. 24.) Other 
store personnel searched along Respondent's route out of 
the store and in the area of the scuffle but failed to find 
any stolen.merchandise. (This is obviously because 
Respondent had not stolen anything.) Sometime later two 
Ogden City police officers arrived. During a conversation 
between Avondet and one of the police officers in a hallway, 
Respondent overheard, for the first time, the police officer 
mention assault, after only hearing Avondet's side of the 
story. (R. 28-29.) 
After the discussion in the hall between Avondet 
and the officer, Respondent was told by the officer he was 
free to go. (R. 31.) Respondent was never formally charged 
with any crime as a result of this incident, nor was 
Respondent ever brought before a magistrate. After being 
released, Respondent was again forced to make the embarras-
sing walk out of the Skaggs store, under the gaze of 
employees and customers. 
Respondent instituted this lawsuit against Skaggs, 
seeking $10,000.00 in general damages and $50,000.00 in 
punitive damages. At trial, while discussing the various 
requested instructions, it became apparent for the first 
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time that Appellant was going to attempt to justify the 
arrest, claiming it was predicated on an assault. The trial 
court warned Appellant's counsel that the law, as the judge 
understood it, provided no probable cause privilege for such 
an arrest by a private citizen. (R. 197.) Appellant, none-
theless, proceeded to adduce "assault" testimony and argue 
this purported defense to the jury. Respondent requested 
and received leave to submit supplemental jury instructions 
concerning assault, which became the court's Instructions 11 
and 12. 
Based on the testimony, instruction, and argument, 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of $10,000.00 general damages and $25,000.00 punitive 
damages. The trial court denied Appellant's Motion for a 
New Trial, and this appeal resulted. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court's instruction that 
there was no probable cause privilege for a private arrest 
for assault accurately reflects the law of Utah. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in denying 
Respondent's motion that any assault arrest privilege had 
been lost by failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate. 
3. Whether the trial court's instruction requiring 
Appellant to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an 
-5-
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assault had been "committed" accurately reflects the law 
of Utah. 
4. Whether the rule of stare decisis is to be 
totally ignored and this Court reverse Terrv v. ZCMI, 605 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
ACCURATELY REFLECTED UTAH LAN. 
A. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING 
MERCHANTS' PRIVILEGES IN SHOPLIFTING 
CASES PROPERLY STATED UTAH LAW. 
Given the organization of Appellant's Brief, it 
is difficult to determine whether or not Appellant is still 
maintaining that the trial court's instructions concerning 
merchants' privileges in shoplifting cases were proper. It 
makes little difference whether Appellant is so arguing or 
not. Even a cursory reading of the instructions shows 
their adequacy. 
First, it is incorrect to state that Section 
78-11-17, Utah Code Annotated, does not reauire a "reason 
to believe." (Brief of Appellant, p.8.) In fact, the 
statute contains those precise words. Thus, the trial 
court's Instruction No. 7, which clearly lays out the 
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requirements of reasonable belief, adequately summarizes the 
merchant's privilege. The other instructions requested by 
Skaggs would therefore have been merely improperly cumula-
tive. See e.g. 75 Am. Jur. 2d 597, Trials, Sec. 630. 
Further, Appellant has not even attempted to make a cursory 
showing that any imagined impropriety in the instructions 
had any effect whatsoever on the jury in their deliberations. 
B. 
THERE IS NO PRIVATE PROBABLE 
CAUSE PRIVILEGE IN UTAH TO 
ARREST FOR ASSAULT. 
The circumstances under which a orivate person is 
privileged to arrest another in the State of Utah are stated 
very clearly in one single sentence. Section 77-7-3 states: 
A private person may arrest another for a 
public offense committed or attempted in 
his presence. (Formerly Section 77-13-4) 
No matter how many times one reads the above statute, the 
words "probable cause" fail to appear. Despite this obvi-
ously intentional legislative omission - and certainly no 
one contends that the Legislature could not have created 
such a privilege if it wanted (see e.g. 77-7-2, formerly 
77-13-3) - Appellant maintains that a "fair reading" 
requires this Court to insert "probable cause" into the 
statute. 
This would not only be unfair; it would also be 
judicial activi~~ of its worst kind. The statute plainly 
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requires the offense to have been "committed;" and in the 
ordinary English language, "committed" requires that the 
act or offense to have actually occurred. 
Simply put, a private person - even a store 
security officer - is not a policeman and not entitled to 
the same privileges and protections. If Ms. Avondet wants 
to arrest someone for the crime of assault, she had better 
be right. She wasn't. As the American Law Institute 
states in the Restatement of the Law, Torts, Second, 
Section 119, Comment 0: 
If, in fact, no breach of the peace [the 
crime of assault in this case] has been 
committed, a mistaken belief on the part 
of the actor that a breach of the peace 
[assault) has been committed by the other 
does not confer a privilege to arrest 
under clause (c). Thus, for a private 
person to claim a privilege to arrest, it 
must be shown that the crime was actually 
committed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Other authorities are unanimous in support of 
this rule. In 32 Am. Jur. 2d 166, False Imprisonment, Sec-
tion 97, it is stated: 
It follows that liability for false arrest 
or imprisonment may arise when a private 
individual or a peace officer makes an 
arrest for a misdemeanor and the offense 
complained of was actually not committed, 
even though such arrest is made on rea-
sonable grounds and in good faith. 
(Footnotes omitted, Emphasis added.) 
Note that this section even imposes liability on police 
officers for a mistake concerning arrests for misdemeanors 
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committed in their presence. The privilege sought by 
Appellant would afford security officers greater protection 
than police officers; a clearly nonsensical result. See 
also Prosser, Torts, Sec. 26 (4th ed. 1971). 
With all due respect to the various bits of obiter 
dicta cited by Appellant, the law in Utah, which was properly 
reflected by the court's instruction, is that there is no 
private privilege to arrest in a case such as this one, 
based on probable cause. 
Another fact illustrating this point is that such 
a probable cause privilege would have made the various shop-
lifting statutes totally unnecessary. The whole purpose of 
these statutes is to protect the merchants by granting them 
a privilege that they did not have under common nor statu-
tory law. 
c. 
THERE WAS NO "IMMINENT ASSAULT" 
PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Appellant's second attempt to excuse the assault 
arrest is based on a theory of self-defense. The privilege 
it claims, as stated in the Restatement of Torts, Second, 
Sec. 67, is as follows: 
The actor is privileged intentionally to 
confine another ... for the purpose of 
preventing him from inflicting a harmful 
or offensive contact or other bodily harm 
upon the actor .... 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The difficulty with attempting to apply the "ore-.t,; 
vention of imminent assault" privilege to the instant case 
is that the facts simply don't support the purpose of the 
privilege. It is crystal clear that Avondet initially 
intended to arrest Respondent for shoplifting. (R. 95.) 
As defined by the Utah Code, Section 77-7-1 (formerly 
77-13-2), that arrest was completed when Ms. Avondet 
restrained Respondent by grabbing his lapels. Indeed, even 
if Avondet's testimony is to be believed, the first time 
she indicated it was an assault arrest was upstairs in the 
manager's office. Thus, the purpose and policy, i.e., self-
defense, is not served in the least by this contrived 
assault "arrest." 
It is laughable to contend that a person seriously 
bent on committing an assault would be in any way deterred 
by the· pronunciamento: "You're under arrest." Indeed, all 
of the cases and authorities cited by Appellant rely 
heavily on the policy of prevention to justify the arrest. 
See Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Company, 54 P.2d 20, 23 
(Cal. 1936) - "about to injure defendant;" Fanier v. 
Chesapeake and Patomac Telephone Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d 
147, 153 (D.C. 1979) - "protection of his person;" Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 141, Afray - "participating or about 
to participate in the afray." 
Privileges are, and should be, applicable only 
when the policy behind them is served by their application. 
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In the instant case trre policy behind the privilege of pri-
vate arrest for "imminent assault," i.e., self-defense, 
would in no way be served. Avondet's secret intention to 
arrest for assault - and it was so secret that she didn't 
reveal it until everyone was calmly seated in the office -
was in no way related to her self-defense. It was instead, 
as the jury obviously found, merely a trumped-up allegation 
created solely in the attempt to insulate a bad shoplifting 
arrest. 
Moreover, as shown by the testimony of Respondent, 
which should be accepted by this Court on review, the con-
trived assault arrest was created ex post facto. That is, 
Respondent was never informed of this purported justifica-
tion during his confinement. It was obviously created some-
time subsequent in a futile attempt to confuse the jury. 
Fortunately, it did not succeed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING 
A VERDICT, AS REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT 
ON THE ASSAULT ARREST. 
In chambers, after conclusion of the testimony, 
Respondent moved the trial court for a directed verdict of 
false imprisonment on the assault arrest, on the grounds 
that Appellant failed to charge Respondent within a reason-
able period of time. (R. 192.) The court denied the motion 
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on the grounds that this was merely a "transitory" arrest. 
(R. 193.) The court also refused to give Respondent's 
requested supplemental instruction No. ____ (R. 367), 
stating the requirement that Respondent must have been 
brought before a magistrate or else any arrest privilege 
was lost. 
The general law across the United States is that 
a private person making an arrest must bring the arrested 
person before a magistrate within a reasonable period of 
time after the arrest. There is no dispute in the instant 
case that such delivery did not occur. In fact, though it 
was never charged, it is clear that Avondet committed a 
Class B Misdemeanor by such failure. As stated in Section 
77-13-17 (renumbered in the 1981 revision as Section 
77-7-23): 
When an arrest is made without a warrant 
by a peace officer or private person, the 
person arrested shall, without unneces--~ 
sary delay, be taken to the magistrate in 
the precinct of the county or municipality 
in which the offenses occurred, and an 
information, stating the charge against 
the person, shall be made before the 
magistrate. *** Any officer or person 
violating any of the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty of a Class B 
Misdemeanor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The policy behind this statute is not difficult 
to determine. Simply put, an arrested person must be 
brought before a magistrate quickly in order to insure that 
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normal procedures of the criminal law are complied with. 
That manifestly did not occur in this case. 
Accordingly, the court erred in not directing a 
verdict on the contrived assault charge, as any privilege of 
arrest was clearly abused and lost by the failure to bring 
Respondent before a magistrate. See Harper & James, Torts, 
Sec. 3.17 at 274 (1956) and Prosser, Torts, Section 25 at 
130-131 (4th ed. 1971). The court further erred in refusing 
to give Respondent's requested supplemental instruction 
(R. 367.). The instruction is clearly mandated by 
the law and was drawn, verbatim, from Instruction No. 21:19, 
Colorado Jury Instructions, Civil. Even without a directed 
verdict on the assault issue, the jury, with this instruc-
tion, would have had to return a verdict for Respondent 
regarding the assault. Either a directed verdict or 
Respondent's requested instruction would have mooted all 
of Appellant's arguments on the assault issue. 
POINT III 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD FOR 
THE ASSAULT WAS CORRECT. 
It should be noted that this Court not reach the 
"reasonable doubt" issue for two reasons. First, Respondent's 
testimony shows that the alleged assault arrest was merely 
a fiction created for the trial by Ms. Avondet. Respondent, 
according to his testimony, was never informed of any such 
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arrest. Second, as shown in Point II, supra, the trial 
court should have directed the verdict on the assault charge 
for failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate as 
required by Utah law. 
Even should this Court reach the propriety of the 
"reasonable doubt" instruction, the trial court was clearly 
correct. As shown above, Point II-B, suora, there is no 
private privilege to arrest unless the "crime" was actually 
"committed." It seems impossible to determine whether a 
"crime" was "committed" without using criminal standards, 
h o h O o 1 h h I 1 I d 11 w ic is precise y w at t e tria court require . 
Despite the ineluctable logic of the above sylo-
gisrn, Appellant seeks to muddy the waters by citing - out 
of context - several ancient and inapposite authorities. 
In each of these authorities, the question at issue was 
whether a tort or some other action, which has some elements 
parallel to a crime, must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The obvious, and correct, answer is that it need 
not be. 
Such is not the case here. In this case Appellant 
seeks to invoke a statutory privilege to arrest for the 
commission of an actual crime - not a parallel tort. This 
is totally different from Avondet asserting that she 
l,' This is obviously the precise reason that Section 
77-13-17 required the bringing before a magistrate -
viz to set the criminal procedure in motion for an 
ultimate judicial determination of criminality. 
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"arrested" Respondent in self-defense to protect herself 
from an attempted assault. (As shown above, Point II-C, 
supra, such a self-defense privilege to prevent "imminent 
assault" is also inapplicable here.) 
If Avondet had defended on the grounds of self-
defense, the only standard of proof required would have 
been a preponderance. Instead, Appellant attempted to 
invoke a statutory protection, and must .therefore comply 
with its requirements. As stated in Prosser, Torts, Sec. 
2 6 (4th Ed. 19 71) : 
The private person may arrest if a felony 
has in fact been committed, and he has 
reasonable grounds to suspect the man 
whom he arrests, but his authority depends 
on the fact of the crime, and he must take 
the full risk that none has been committed. 
* * * 
It has even been held that the felony 
which has occurred must be the very one 
for which he purports to make the arrest. 
(Citation_s omitted, Emphasis added.) 
Obviously, the protections afforded a private person for a 
mere misdemeanor or breach of the peace are less than these 
for a felony. 
In summary, a private arrest for a crime is only 
privileged if the crime actually was committed. The only 
way to determine commission is by the criminal standard, and 
since Avondet herself frustrated that determination - and 
committed a Class B Misdemeanor while doing so - she should 
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not be allowed to profit from such action. The only way 
for this jury to decide whether a crime had, in fact, been 
2/ 
committed was to test the case by the criminal standards.-
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING THE RULE 
OF STARE DECISIS, PROPERLY APPLIED 
THE TERRY STANDARD OF IMPLIED MALICE. 
Respondent feels constrained to point out that 
Appellant's Point III is not so much an attack on the 
decision in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), as an 
attack on the very foundation of the Anglo-American judicial system -
the rule of stare decisis. Appellant's blatant attempt to 
undermine this rule goes so far as to point out the change 
in membership in this court since Terry. 
This desperate attempt to throw the baby out with 
the bath water forgets what this Court surely will not. 
This Court is not the sum of its members nor its members 
individually. It is a continuing, co-equal branch of 
government charged with interpreting the laws of the State 
of Utah. The lower courts in Utah, as required by our 
system of justice, look to it for guidance and follow its 
decisions. This is how it should be. 
Since this Court decided Terry, the Utah Legisla-
ture has met twice in Budget Session, once in General 
Y It goes almost without saying that the police offi-
cer's testimony concerning the "assault" is without 
any weight. His opinion was formed after talking to 
only one party to the event and hearing her self-
serving story. 
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Session, and several times in Special Session. Despite 
these ample opportunities, the Legislature has never modi-
fied this Court's ruling in Terry concerning malice, though 
it certainly had the power to do so. This continuing 
acquiescence affixes the legislative imprimatur on this 
Court's decision and also mandates the required procedure 
for its change - i.e., legislation. Black Bull, Inc., v. 
Industrial Commission, 547 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1976). 
Aside from the foregoing, Terry ~ correctly 
decided, notwithstanding Professor Boyce's "Thumbnail 
Sketch" and a student "Development," for all the reasons 
cited in the Court's opinion. These reasons need not be 
reiterated here, as they are more eloquently stated in this 
Court's own opinion. 
There is no dispute that the trial court properly 
applied the Terry rule in making its instruction concerning 
punitive damages. The instruction, No. 14 (R. 377), was 
basically JIFU 90.76 with changes showing implied malice in 
law and enumerating those factors which the jury could con-
sider in determining the amount of punitive damages. 
Even should this Court decide to overrule Terry, 
it should do so prospectively, leaving the verdict here 
intact. There is ample precedent for such an action, and 
the United States Supreme Court has recently furnished guide-
lines for determining to grant prospective application. In 
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Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Company, U.S. , 50 Law Week 4892, 4902 (Nos. 150 & 
--
546, June 28, 1982), holding the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 in 
conflict with Article III of the Constitution, the Court 
stated: 
Our decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 
404 u. S. 97 (1971), sets forth the three 
considerations recognized by our prece-
dents as properly bearing upon the issue 
of retroactivity. They are, first, whe-
ther the holding in question 'decid[ed] an 
issue of first impression whose resolu-
tion was not clearly foreshadowed' by 
earlier cases, id., at 106; second, 
•whether retrospective operation will 
further or retard (the] operation• of the 
holding in question, id., at 107; and 
third, whether retroactive application 
•could produce substantial inequitable 
results' in individual cases, ibid. 
In the instant case, as in Northern Pipeline, all 
three tests militate against retroactive application. 
Clearly, there have been no augeries foreshadowing this 
Court overruling its own recent Terry decision. Neither 
would retroactivity aid in the application of such a new 
holding. Finally, retroactivity would be extremely in-
equitable requiring a re-trial with all its attendant pain, 
delay, and cost. 
The trial court, counsel, and the jury followed 
... 
the directives of this Court as well as humanly possible. 
It would be unfair and unjust to change the rules of the 
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game after it is over. Stare decisis should hold, Terry 
should be followed, and this appeal dismissed. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
Appellant tried to cover up a bad shoplifting 
arrest with a contrived assault arrest. The jury did not 
fall for it, and now, on appeal, Appellant asserts several 
alleged "errors" on behalf of the trial court in an attempt 
to have this Court do for it what the jury refused to do. 
The trial court did not err in instructing the 
jury that there is no private probable cause arrest privi-
lege for assault. The unambiguous language of the statute 
simply doesn't create such a privilege. 
Further, the facts don't support an arrest for 
the prevention of "imminent assault." The bad shoplifting 
arrest was already completed, and the policy of self-defense 
was in no way served by Avondet's secret intentions. 
The trial court did err in not directing a verdict 
for Respondent on the grounds that, even assuming arguendo 
an assault arrest privilege existed, Appellant's criminal 
failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate waived any 
privilege. This ruling would have mooted the first two 
issues and resolved the confusion created by Appellant's 
cover-up. 
-19-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finally, Respondent, the trial court, and the 
jury are entitled, under stare decisis, to rely on the con-
tinuing vitality of this Court's holdings. The rule of 
Terry was properly applied, and the verdict should be 
upheld. 
This appeal should be dismissed and Respondent 
given final relief and vindication from the ordeal he 
suffered at the hands of Appellant. 
DATED this day of September, 1982. 
FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY 
BRUCE R. BAIRD 
(Attorneys for Respondent) 
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